As usual, the model relates quality and productivity through a power function of the type:
The consumer's problem
I consider a world of C countries indexed by i, varying in size and location, in which consumers maximize a CES utility across a continuum of varieties over the set V available in country i. I assume consumers/buyers are able to recognize "quality" from "productivity" products.
Heterogeneity among consumers of various countries relies on the intensity of their preference for quality ! ! . Like in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008) , I introduce the term ! ! representing an endogenous shock to the quality parameter in country i. This shock has a downgrading effect on the quality parameter, in other words it represents the effect of a bad reputation on consumers' valuation of quality. For productivity products, the quality term becomes ! ! ! ! = 1. The consumer maximizes utility according to a quality-adjusted demand
The parameter ! is the elasticity of substitution across products and as usual, it is the same across countries. 1 Given the budget constraint of country i where the income ! ! equals to expenditure ! ! = ! ! ! ! , with ! ! , the consumers' supply of labor to firms and ! ! their wage, the quality-adjusted demand for the variety v becomes:
quality-adjusted price index. This allows defining a physical demand 2 quite similar to Johnson (2009) with:
The producer's problem
As usual in the literature, a Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition characterizes the supply-side of the model so that a single firm produces each variety and there is free entry into the industry. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity in the sense that marginal cost varies across firms. Firms from i incur fixed costs ! !" of selling to market j.
Firms' productivity is Pareto distributed, with the distribution function ! ! over ! ! , +∞ and a continuous cumulative distribution ! ! . Operating profits of a country i's firm producing variety v and selling to j is classically expressed as:
Assuming a continuum of firms and a reasonable number of them allows for the disappearance of strategic interactions. Thus, when maximizing their profits, firms charge a mill price with a constant mark-up over marginal costs:
The country specific factor cost is ! ! and ! = 1 ! is the firm's specific factor requirement, or the inverse of its productivity, needed to produce one unit of the variety v. If a firm from i seeks to sell its products to consumers in j, those consumers bear an additional transport cost ! !" defined in a Samuelson's iceberg costs fashion. Therefore, consumers price becomes:
Thus the capacity of a given firm to produce quality depends on the interaction of three parameters:
-The firm's productivity ! = 1 !: the higher a firm's productivity, the more likely it produces quality products.
-The country's capacity to produce quality 1 ! ! : the higher this capacity, the lower the additional costs of producing quality.
-The intensity of consumers' preference for quality ! ! : the more one country's consumers find utility in consuming quality products, the more firms are prompt to switch to a quality strategy. The higher the shock on the quality parameter, the lower ! ! ! ! .
Thus the quality threshold is reflected by the upper limit level of factor requirement ! for which it is profitable to switch to a quality strategy. This threshold corresponds to the specific productivity level for which ! ! ! = ! ! ! implying ! ! ! ! = ! ! ! . This allows to define a quality-adjusted price such that:
where ! = ! !!! ! ! ! ! represents the quality-adjusted factor requirement. It can be highlighted that
Every firm with a factor requirement ! ≤ ! has a qualityadjusted price ! ! ! ≤ ! ! ! and thus finds an advantage in switching from productivity to quality products.
I consider that fixed cost is the same whether the firm decides to produce under quality or productivity strategy. 3 I assume that ! !! = 0. A firm exports to country j if and only if ! !" ≥ 0 with firm's revenues from selling to country j such as: 4
Thus, the condition for one firm of country i to export to country j is
, implying the following cut-off condition:
The cut-off condition for a firm to export productivity products is the same as in the benchmark productivity-sorting model. If ! !" > ! then ! !" > ! !" , at the cut-off, firms do not find any advantage in producing under a quality strategy. Under this condition, the existence of the quality strategy does not increase the number of firms able to export to j. Firms from i are only able to export to j if their productivity is at least ! !" = 1 ! !" . A specificity of this model lies in the extreme case where all firms from i export under quality-sorting; that is where ! !" < ! !" and ! !" < ! !" . Therefore, around the cut-off, some firms that would not have been able to export to j under productivity-sorting are now able to export under qualitysorting. In other words, the possibility to switch to quality production can enable firms with a factor requirement c such that ! !" < ! < ! !" < ! < ! !" to export to j. For convenience, I focus 3 Making fixed costs differ whether producing quality or productivity products complicates unnecessarily the model without yielding more interesting results for the purpose of this paper.
